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Abstract
A method is presented for using the consistent part of inconsistent
axiomatic systems.
1. Half a Century of Practice of Inconsistent Mathematics
Rather missed in the conscious awareness of many, we have been doing
inconsistent mathematics for more than half a century by now, and in
fact, have quite heavily and essentially depended on it in our everyday
life. Indeed, electronic digital computers, when considered operating
on integers, which is but a part of their operations, act according to
the system of axioms given by
• (PA) : the usual Peano Axioms for N,
plus the ad-hock axiom, according to which
• (MI) : there exists M ∈ N, M >> 1, such that M + 1 = M
Such anM , called ”machine infinity”, is usually larger than 10100, how-
ever, it is inevitably inherent in every electronic digital computer, due
to obvious unavoidable physical limitations. And clearly, the above
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mix of (PA) + (MI) axioms is inconsistent. Yet we do not mind flying
on planes designed and built with the use of such electronic digital
computers.
2. A Way to Handle General Inconsistencies
The example of the mentioned quite elementary inconsistency charac-
terizing each and every electronic digital computer can suggest a way
to deal with rather arbitrary inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Namely, the way inconsistencies in computation with integers are
avoided in electronic digital computers is simply by never reaching
overflow. In other words, it is made sure that additions, subtractions
and multiplications lead to results well within the range of integers
between −M and M . It is of course more difficult to avoid overflow
when operating on decimal numbers, since in such a case one also has
to guard against divisions with numbers that are too small.
However, such a rather simple manner of avoiding inconsistencies in
a system which is essentially inconsistent can be extrapolated far be-
yond the above case of (PA) + (MI) axioms. Here we shall indicate
such a way, which may be seen as a simplification of an idea of Go¨del,
and pursued later by Ehrenfeucht & Mycielski, see Manin [pp. 258-
260].
Let L be a formal language over an alphabet A. Let W be a set of
well formed formulas in L. Lastly, let D be a deduction rule which
for every subset of well formed formulas S ⊆ W gives the subset
of well formed formulas D(S) ⊆ W which are the consequences of S.
We shall later specify a certain finitary type condition on this mapping
(2.1) D : P(W) −→ P(W)
where as usual, P(W) denotes the set of all subsets of W.
A theory T ⊆ W in such a setup (A,L,W,D) can be seen as the
result of the following construction. Given a set of axioms A ⊆ W,
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one obtains T by the sequence of operations
(2.2)
T0(A) = A
T1(A) = D(T0(A))
T2(A) = D(T1(A))
...
Tn+1(A) = D(Tn(A))
...
according to
(2.3) T = T (A) =
⋃
n∈N Tn(A)
In the case of an inconsistent set A of axioms, one typically has
(2.4) T (A) =W
and in the sequel, we shall consider (2.4) as the definition of the in-
consistency of the set A of axioms.
Let us now give a way to avoid inconsistencies in a theory T (A) which
satisfies (2.4), thus itself as a whole is inconsistent.
Here by avoiding inconsistency we mean identifying certain sentences
P ∈ T (A) for which exists a subset of axioms B ⊆ A, such that
P ∈ T (B), while B is not inconsistent, that is, we have T (B) $W.
For every P ∈ T (A), and in view of (2.2), (2.3), we denote by
(2.5) nA,P ∈ N
the smallest n ∈ N, such that P ∈ Tn(A). Obviously, nA,P is well
defined.
Let us now assume that the mapping (2.1) is finitely generated, that
is, it satisfies the condition
(2.6) D(S) =
⋃
D(F)
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for all S ⊆ W, where the union is taken over all finite subsets F ⊆ S.
Then it is easy to see that the following properties result
(2.7) D(S) ⊆ D(S ′)
for S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ W.
Also, for every family Si ⊆ W, with i ∈ I, we have
(2.8)
⋃
i∈I D(Si) ⊆ D(
⋃
i∈I Si)
Furthermore, if the family Si ⊆ W, with i ∈ I, is right directed with
respect to inclusion, then
(2.9)
⋃
i∈I D(Si) = D(
⋃
i∈I Si)
Given now P ∈ Tn(A), for a certain n ∈ N, n ≥ 1, then (2.2) leads to
finite subsets
(2.10) Sn−1 ⊆ Tn−1(A), Sn−2 ⊆ Tn−2(A), . . . , S0 ⊆ T0(A) = A
such that
(2.11) P ∈ D(Sn−1), Sn−1 ⊆ D(Sn−2), . . . , S1 ⊆ D(S0)
Indeed, the sequence Sn−1, Sn−2, . . . , S0 in (2.10), (2.11) results
from (2.2), and thus we only have to show that its terms can be
chosen as finite subsets. Here we note that (2.6), (2.11) give a fi-
nite subset Fn−1 ⊆ Sn−1, such that P ∈ D(Fn−1). Further, for ev-
ery Qn−1 ∈ Fn−1, there is a finite subset FQn−1 ⊆ Sn−2, such that
Qn−1 ∈ D(FQn−1). Thus in view of (2.8), we have
Fn−1 ⊆
⋃
Qn−1∈Fn−1
D(FQn−1) ⊆ D(
⋃
Qn−1∈Fn−1
FQn−1)
and obviously,
⋃
Qn−1∈Fn−1
FQn−1 is a finite subset. And the argument
follows in the same way, till it reaches S0.
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We denote by
(2.12) ΣA,P
the set of all such sequences Sn−1, Sn−2, . . . , S0 which satisfy (2.10),
(2.11).
The interest in ΣA,P is obvious. Indeed, if
(2.13) ∃ (Sn−1, Sn−2, . . . , S0) ∈ ΣA,P : T (S0) $W
then in view of (2.10), (2.11), the sentence P ∈ Tn(A) belongs to a
consistent part of the theory T (A). Therefore, we denote by
(2.14) CA
the set of all such sentences P .
Finally, a rather simple way to identify sentences in CA, a way sug-
gested by the usual method of avoiding ”machine infinity”, is as fol-
lows.
For every P ∈ Tn(A), with n ∈ N, n ≥ 1, we define its ⁀index given by
the two natural numbers
(2.15) ιA,P = (nA,P , mA,P )
where nA,P was defined in (2.5), while for the second one we have
(2.16) mA,P = min
∑
length(S)
where
(2.17) length :W −→ N
and length(S), for S ∈ W, denotes the number of letters in the alpha-
bet A, with the possible repetitions counted, which constitute S, while
the minimum is taken over all sequences (Sn−1, Sn−2, . . . , S0) ∈ ΣA,P ,
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and the sum is taken over all S ∈ Sn−1 ∪ Sn−2 ∪ . . . ∪ S0.
We define now
(2.18) κA = min ιA,P
where the minimum is taken in the lexicographic order on N×N, and
over all P ∈ T (A) \ CA.
Then in view of the above, one obtains
Theorem 2.1.
If for P ∈ T (A) one has in the lexicographic order on N× N
(2.19) ιA,P < κA
then
(2.20) P ∈ CA
Remark 2.1.
1) An upper estimate of κA can easily be obtained, since it is enough
to make use of one single P ∈ T (A) \ CA.
2) One can obviously replace the axioms A ⊆ W with an equivalent
set of axioms A ⊆ W, which means that
(2.21) T (A) = T (B)
And as follows under appropriate conditions from Ehrenfeucht & My-
cielski, see also Manin [pp. 258-260], with such a replacement one may
rather arbitrarily shorten, or for that matter, lengthen the proofs of
sentences P ∈ T (A) = T (B). Such an equivalent replacement of ax-
ioms, therefore, can rather arbitrarily change ιA,P , and hence also κA.
And obviously, any increase in the latter makes the result in Theorem
2.1. above more strong, that is, it weakens the condition (2.19), and
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thus it increases the eventuality of condition (2.20).
3) In the above, the mapping (2.1) was not required to satisfy the
condition
(2.22) S ⊆ D(S)
for S ⊆ W.
4) The more general use of inconsistent mathematics, [4], than merely
in our electronic digital computers, as well as of mathematics devel-
oped upon self-referential logic, [1], could become future trends. Both
obviously open ways to realms not studied or used so far, and the
latter brings with it impressive possibilities in dealing with structures
with complexities not encountered so far.
3. Comments
A brief consideration of the millennia old relevant historical back-
ground may be appropriate.
Among fundamental ideas that have for long ages preoccupied hu-
mans, and apparently did so even prior to the existence of literate
cultures and civilizations, have been those of self-reference, infinity
and change. These ideas appear time and again in a variety of forms
of expression, and as such, the wonder and puzzlement they have al-
ways produced and still keep producing have not been lost until our
own days.
Self-reference, for instance, can be found illustrated since prehistoric
times by a snake which bites its own tail. It is also clearly expressed
in the ancient Greek Paradox of the Liar which, in its modern version
and within set theory, takes the form of Russell’s Paradox.
Needless to say, with such a record, the idea took quite strongly hold
ever since ancient times that one should better avoid self-reference,
since it does so easily lead to paradoxes. And the effect of that per-
sistent and pervasive view has been the association of the manifestly
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negative term of ”vicious circle” with any form of self-reference.
On the other hand, and apparently prior to the emergence of the Para-
dox of the Liar, the Old Testament, in Exodus 3:14, gives the name
of God by what is for all purposes an ultimate and all encompassing
self-reference, namely, ”I Am that I Am”.
Infinity and change is, among others, the substance of Zeno’s surpris-
ing paradoxes which until our own days have not been fully clarified.
Yet, unlike with self-reference, neither infinity, nor change got such a
negative aura as to impel us into their avoidance. And in fact, since
Newton’s Calculus, both change and infinity have become fundamental
in Mathematics, with their extraordinary consequences for technology.
What has, however, appeared to had been perfectly clarified since time
immemorial is logical contradiction. Indeed, there does not appear to
be any record of an instance when, due to some reason, the decision
was taken to avoid contradiction at all costs, and do so without any
exception. After all, paradoxes themselves are paradoxes only if we
outlaw logical contradiction, and do so in absolutely every case when
it may appear. Thus in particular, the Paradoxes of the Liar or of
Zeno would instantly lose much of their significance if we were to be
more lenient with logical contradictions.
It is against such a background, therefore, that ”inconsistent math-
ematics” and the ”vicious circles” of ”non-well-founded” set theory
come to the fore.
However, several aspects in this regard are worth noting.
First perhaps, is the fact that, at least since the mid 1940s, when we
started more and more massively using and relying upon electronic
digital computers, we have in fact been permanently practicing ”in-
consistent mathematics”, including in may extremely important situa-
tions, and were doing so without giving it any special thought. In this
regard it may be noted that Mortensen’s 1995 book itself gives hardly
any consideration to the obvious and elementary logical contradiction
between the Peano Axioms and the inevitable existence of a so called
”machine infinity” in each and every electronic digital computer.
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The good news in this regard, nevertheless, is that at last we do no
longer keep being lost in that immemorial decision to avoid logical
contradiction by all means and without any exception.
As for the essentially self-referential nature of the so called ”non-well-
founded” set theory in the 1996 book of Barwise and Moss, its original
motivation is to a good extent also related to electronic digital com-
puters, namely, to the construction of the various formal languages
which facilitate their use.
In this way, our long not noted or disregarded essential involvement
in ”inconsistent mathematics” came about as an imposition by the
hardware of electronic digital computers. On the other hand, our rel-
atively recent interest in the self-referential ”vicious circles” of ”non-
well-founded” set theory was inspired by important software aspects
related to electronic digital computers.
For the time being, however, each of these developments seem to pro-
ceed strictly on its own way. Indeed, ”inconsistent mathematics” is
not getting involved in self-reference. As for the self-referential ”vi-
cious circles” of ”non-well-founded” set theory, it is very carefully kept
away from any sort of logical contradictions, that accomplishment be-
ing in fact one of its basic aims, as well as claims to success.
Needless to say, both these developments can turn into extraordinary
openings in Mathematics and in Mathematical Logic. And yet, a far
greater opening is there, in bringing them together at some future
time.
Until then, by avoiding any sort of logical contradictions, the ”vicious
circles” of ”non-well-founded” set theory can develop sufficiently and
gain a well deserved respectability. After that, the inclusion of logical
contradictions in its further development may contribute significantly
to its further development.
And such a development may simply mean no more than setting at
last aside two ancient and deeply rooted habits of thinking, namely,
horror of logical contradictions, and extreme suspicion of self-reference.
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